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CONCERNING RACIAL
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SENTENCING: STEPHENS V. STATE




Statistical evidence has been accepted in a wide variety of legal
cases, including trademark confusion,' product liability,2 and jury and
employment discrimination.3 Recently, statistics introduced on behalf
of defendants who have challenged the fairness of sentencing prac-
tices have been poorly received by courts, as compared to their accept-
ability in equal pay and related fair employment cases. In this article
we argue that the usefulness of aggregating the results of many
prosecutorial decisions into a statistical analysis may not be adequately
appreciated by the legal system. This lack of appreciation may be par-
tially due to the fact that rarely is any data set perfect; one can almost
always assert that information about some potentially relevant variable
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is lacking or that the sample is not sufficiently large. In the context of
two recent cases involving claims of racial disparities in drug offense
sentencing4 we illustrate how a fuller use of statistical techniques ap-
plied to the data might have strengthened the claims of the
defendants.
5
II. OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF STATISTICS IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
Ever since the United States Supreme Court adopted statistical
testing in the Castenada v. Partida6 jury discrimination case, statistical
evidence has been used in many types of cases concerning discrimina-
tion regarding race, age, or sex.7 When a plaintiff in a civil case claims
disparate treatment, or a defendant in a criminal case introduces sta-
tistical evidence as part of their primafacie case, the purpose is to show
that otherwise comparable individuals of the protected class are being
treated less favorably than those from the majority group.
In Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,8 the Supreme Court
outlined the order of proof needed to show disparate treatment in an
employment discrimination case.9 In Batson v. Kentucky,'0 the Court
adapted this standard to criminal cases in which the defendant claims
that the prosecution abused its discretion in making peremptory chal-
lenges at trial by eliminating a disproportionate number of minority
venirepersons."1 Once a defendant raises a Batson claim, presumably
based on the fact that most if not all minority venirepersons were
eliminated, the prosecution must advance a neutral explanation for
their removal. Then the defendant is given the opportunity to
4 U.S. v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga.
1995).
5 Careful statistical analysis can also support the prosecution's case. In U.S. v. Olvis, 97
F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Armstrongdecision's term "sim-
ilarly situated" for purposes of selective prosecution cases as meaning that the circum-
stances surrounding their cases present no distinguishable legitimate factors justifying
different prosecutorial decisions. Id. at 744. The defendants were part of a crack cocaine
conspiracy and the government indicted twenty-five people, all of whom were black. There
were a total of eighty participants; five were white and the rest black. The probability that
no whites would be selected if twenty-five individuals were chosen from this pool of eighty
is .1447, noticeably larger than the usual .05 level corresponding to the two-standard devia-
tion criteria. See infra note 12 for an explanation. Thus, the data does not indicate that
black conspirators were more likely to be prosecuted than whites by any statistically signifi-
cant degree.
6 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
7 See Doan v. Seagate Technology, 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996) (age discrimination);
Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996) (race discrimination);
Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sex discrimination).
8 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
9 Id. at 252-56.
10 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
11 Id. at 93-96.
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demonstrate that the state's reasons are insufficient or pretextual.
The trial court then must determine whether the defendant has estab-
lished purposeful discrimination. This procedure is sensible, as only
the prosecution possesses the information that it uses to decide which
venirepersons to challenge.
In the typical jury discrimination case, the plaintiff uses data for a
number of venires to compare the number of minority jurors to its
expected number, derived from the minority fraction of persons eligi-
ble for jury service. A plaintiff in a hiring discrimination case would
do much the same. This technique has been called "standard devia-
tion" analysis, as the difference between the actual number of minori-
ties and the numbers expected if selections were randomly chosen
from the eligible pool is measured in units of the sampling variability,
called standard deviation. 12
In cases concerning the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, Batson allowed the defendant to establish a prima facie case
based solely on evidence concerning the prosecution's exercise of its
peremptory challenges in his own case.' 3 The Court noted that the
peremptory challenge process enables those who have a mind to dis-
criminate to do so. 14 The decision in Batson overruled Swain v. Ala-
bama,15 which required the defendant to demonstrate a pattern of
discriminatory peremptory strikes in a reasonable number of similar
cases. In Batson the Court noted that this was an extremely difficult
12 The standard deviation method was described by the Court in Castenada v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977). When n people are hired from a qualified labor pool and p
is the minority fraction of that pool, then one expects np of the hires to be minority mem-
bers. If one assumes the hires are randomly selected from the pool, the "sampling variabil-
ity" of the number of minority hires is measured by the standard deviation
$ = Vnp (1-p)
There is about a 95% chance that the number of minority hires in a random sample
will be within 2 standard deviations from the expected number np. When the observed
number of minorities is not in this interval, statisticians call this a "statistically significant"
result as it suggests that the observed data is inconsistent with the assumed fraction p. For
example, suppose women form 25% of the qualified labor force and a company hires 100
employees. We expect np = 100(.25) = 25 women to be hired. The standard deviation is
4up (1-p) = 425 (.75) = 4.33
If only 10 women are hired we calculate the difference between the observed and expected
number of hires expressed in standard deviation units, i.e.,
Observed-expeted = - = -3.46
4.33 4.33
This difference exceeds three standard deviations and implies that statistically significantly
fewer women were hired than expected given their proportion of the relevant labor pool.
13 Batum, 476 U.S. at 96.
14 Id.
15 380 U.S. 202 (1966).
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hurdle for defendants, and essentially impossible in jurisdictions
where the requisite information-the race of the jurors-was not pre-
served.' 6 The Court did not state that defendants must only use infor-
mation from their own case; rather, statistical data on the practices of
the same prosecutor or of prosecutors from the same office or in the
same system is admissible evidence in conjunction with the pattern of
strikes in the defendant's trial.
Before describing the criteria courts have used to evaluate the
completeness of a statistical analysis, we note that Justice Powell's
opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp17 distinguished death-sentencing cases
from employment discrimination cases with respect to the number of
potentially relevant variables, and asserted that there is no common
standard by which to compare and evaluate all defendants who were
eligible for the death penalty.18 Since the death penalty may be given
for a wide variety of very serious offenses it is unclear that this reserva-
tion concerning statistical analysis of sentencing data should apply to
a more homogeneous set of crimes.
In practice, virtually no data set is ideal; one can almost always
suggest another potentially relevant variable or question the accuracy
of the measurement of a factor: for example, is education adequately
measured by years of school completed or does one need the grade
point average too? In the context of a regression analysis, which
predicts pay as a function of appropriate factors like seniority,19 the
Court in Bazemore v. Fridaf0 stated that it is not necessary for a party
offering a regression to incorporate all measurable variables relating
to productivity as long as the model includes the major ones. In legal
terms, omissions should affect the weight or importance of the evi-
dence rather than its admissibility. Subsequently, in Allen v. Seidman,21
Judge Posner noted that it is easy to take "pot shots" at a statistical
16 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 n.17.
17 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
18 Id. at 294-95, n.14.
19 In equal pay cases regression analysis fits the salary data to an equation incorporating
the factors related to job productivity. For example, one might believe that years of experi-
ence and years of education above high school increase one's productivity in a particular
job or set ofjobs. The model might then be:
Salary = Constant + b(Experience) + c(Education) + d(Sex).
The coefficients b, c and d reflect the role of the corresponding factor. If sex does not play
a role in salary determination, the coefficient d should be zero. Statistical tests, which
incorporate sampling variation in the estimate of d-i.e., on actual data from a fair em-
ployer the value of d might differ from zero due to random factors-are available. More
details can be found in Judge Patrick Higginbotham's opinion in Vuyanich v. Republic Na-
tional Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980), or in 1 JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL
REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC PoLicY ch. 8 (1988).
20 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
21 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
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analysis and that the defendant needs to do more than simply raise a
potential flaw.22 The critic should show that the flaw would seriously
influence the ultimate inference. A number of statistical methods
have been developed for assessing the potential effect of missing
data,23 omitted variables, 24 and errors of measurement 25 These
methods can be used to assist courts in evaluating statistical evidence.
III. STEPHENS v STATE. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORIAL
REQUESTS FOR LIFE SENTENCES FOR REPEAT
DRUG OFFENDERS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Mr. Stephens challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia law
26
which provided for mandatory life imprisonment upon a second con-
viction for the sale of a controlled substance or possession with intent
to distribute a controlled substance. As the law gives prosecutors the
discretion to seek a life sentence, he contended that the law was ap-
plied in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of both the
United States and Georgia Constitutions.
To support his claim, Stephens submitted both statewide and
county-wide statistical data. A statewide study conducted by the Geor-
gia Department of Corrections showed that of all persons eligible for a
life sentence, only 1 of 168 whites sentenced for two or more convic-
tions for drug sales is serving a life sentence compared to 202 out of
1219 blacks.27 Apparently the statistical significance of this data was
not calculated and submitted into evidence. 28 The court also found
22 Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1989).
23 See RODERIKJA LrrrL & DONALD B. RUBIN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS WITH MISSING
DATA (1987).
24 See PAUL 1. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES (1995);Joseph L. Gastwirth, Methods
for Assessing the Sensitivity of Statistical Comparisons Used in Title VII Cases to Omitted Variables,
33JuRmsETRics 19 (1992).
25 WAYNE FULLER, MFASUREMENT ERROR MODELS (1987).
26 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1--30(d).
27 Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1995).
28 The data would ordinarily be presented as a two-by-two table reporting the number
of persons of each race who were serving life sentences as well as those. not serving-
Race Life Sentence Lesser Sentence Total
Black 202 1017 1219
White 1 167 168
Total 203 1184 1387
The corresponding proportions, .006 for whites and .166 for blacks, show that black
repeat drug offenders were .166/.006 = 27.8 times more likely to be serving life terms than
whites. The appropriate statistical test is Fisher's exact test, which calculates the probability
that a disparity at least as large as the one observed would occur assuming the 203 drug
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that 98.4% (369 of 375) of the state's prisoners serving life sentences
for drug offenses were African-American, although they constituted
only 27% of the state's population. In Hall County, where the defend-
ant was convicted, all fourteen persons serving a life sentence for drug
offenses were African-American. 29 The dissent noted that African-
Americans form less than ten percent of the county's population, but
accounted for 50% to 60% of those arrested in drug investigations.30
In a divided opinion, the majority held that this statistical evi-
dence was insufficient to support Stephens' claim of an equal protec-
tion violation under the Georgia Constitution. The opinion observed
that Stephens failed to present critical evidence concerning persons
eligible for life sentences under the statute in Hall County, but against
whom the district attorney failed to seek the enhanced sentence.3'
The majority noted that in each judicial circuit the district attorney
exercises discretion in seeking the increased sentence, so that a de-
fendant must present some evidence addressing whether the prosecu-
tor handling a particular case engaged in selective prosecution in
order to prove a state equal protection violation.
3 2
Judge Fletcher went on to criticize the statistical study for ignor-
ing other factors that may explain the disparity in sentencing. His
opinion mentions the following possibly significant factors: the charge
brought, concurrent offenses, prior offenses and sentences, the type
of lawyer (retained or court-appointed), whether the defendant plead
guilty, the circuit where convicted, and the defendant's legal status.33
Furthermore, Judge Fletcher wrote, "[w] ithout more adequate infor-
mation about what is happening.., we defer deciding whether statis-
tical evidence alone can ever be sufficient to prove an allegation of
discriminatory intent in sentencing under the Georgia constitution. '3 4
Thus, the issue of the type of proof defendants need to offer to estab-
lish differential treatment of eligible individuals and the role of statis-
tical evidence in these cases remains unsettled.
offenders were chosen at random from the 1387 eligibles. This probability is zero to eight
decimal places, which is far more significant than the usual .05 or .01 levels used in so-
cial science and most equal employment cases. The formula appears in 1 JOSEPH L.
GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 217-25 (1988), and the test
has been accepted in equal employment cases.
29 Stephens, 456 S.E.2d at 560-61.
30 Id. at 568 n.3 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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B. THE MINORI=Y OPINION
The dissent, written by Judge Benham, described the statistics as
"numbing and paralyzing,"3 5 and objected to the majority opinion's
failure to state that they substantiate a need for serious inquiry. After
reviewing some of the major U.S. cases on jury discrimination, he
noted that Batson held that an inference of discriminatory intent
could be drawn from certain conduct or statistical data and recog-
nized that the crucial information about an allegedly discriminatory
decision could only come from the one who made the decision. 6
Judge Benham believed that Batson was more relevant to Ste-
phens' case than McCleskey because Stephens concerned a well-defined
sentencing process for a small number of related criminal activities.
His dissent implied that the application of the Georgia statute allows a
prosecutor's charging discretion to be exercised in a discriminatory
fashion just as peremptory challenges may be used to discriminate.
Thus, the prosecutor, when confronted with facts supporting an infer-
ence of discrimination, should bear the burden of explaining the
data.3 7 Moreover, since the life.penalty is only imposed in about 15%
of the cases, he observed that the state should be required to give
race-neutral reasons for the "monochromatic" application of the stat-
ute in Hall County.38
C. A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
1. The Hall County Data
As all opinions in the case mention the importance of Hall
County, the jurisdiction in which Stephens was convicted, we begin by
calculating the probability that all fourteen persons serving life
sentences for drug offenses in Hall County would be black, if drug
suspects were a reasonable pool from which drug offenders would
come. As several investigators stated that between 50% and 60% of
drug investigations involved black males, we will assume that blacks
form 60% of those eligible for life sentences. By choosing the high
end of the range, we favor the state and implicitly allow for a differ-
ence between the racial compositions of drug suspects and repeat of-
fenders, although we believe that the two populations should be
35 Id. at 566 (Benham, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 567 (Benham, J., dissenting). A similar point was made earlier by Amy G.
Applegate, Prosecutoiai Discretion and Discaimination in the Decision to Charge, 55 TEMPLE L Q.
35, 76-78 (1982).
37 Stephens, 456 S.E.2d at 567 (Benham,J., dissenting); see a/soJo-N HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AN DIsRusr 175 (1980) (broad prosecutorial discretion opens the door to racial
discrimination).
38 Stephens, 456 S.E.2d at 570 (Benham, J., dissenting).
9
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similar. Moreover, we assume that targets of investigation are chosen
in a race-neutral manner. The standard binomial test39 is statistically
significant at the usual .05 level. Indeed, the probability of the data is
.0008, or less than one in a thousand. It can thus be shown that in
order for the fourteen of fourteen figure not to be statistically signifi-
cant at the two-sided .05 level, which corresponds to the Court's two
standard deviation criteria, blacks would need to form at least 77% of
those eligible for drug-related life sentences in Hall County.40 While
it is conceivable that blacks might form a somewhat higher percentage
of repeat offenders than they do of drug-related investigation targets
in Hall County, state officials, with better access to the data, should
have the burden of showing a lack of disparity by introducing appro-
priate evidence demonstrating that blacks form over 77% of those eli-
gible for a life sentence.
We also note that African-Americans, who form less than 10% of
the county's population, composed over half the subjects of drug in-
vestigations. Although this fact might raise a question about the race-
neutrality of selecting subjects for investigation of drug-related activ-
ity-for example, whether drugs used more heavily in the black com-
munity were the subject of more investigations than other drugs-the
statistical test ignores this issue and assumes that blacks form 60% of
those eligible for life sentences. If racial bias entered into the process
of choosing drug suspects, the actual percentage of blacks among seri-
ous drug offenders who should be considered for life sentences would
be less than 60%, and the statistical result would be more significant.
4'
2. Are Judge Fletcher's Caveats about the Statewide Data Likely to Explain
the Disparity in Life Sentencing Requests?
Earlier we listed a number of factors that the majority opinion
suggested might reduce the Stephens disparity to a legally acceptable
one. Now we examine them using a statistical technique developed by
Cornfield during the smoking/lung cancer controversy, and used by
Gastwirth 42 to analyze employment discrimination data. The result
gives numerical criteria for an omitted factor, which is either present,
e.g., regular smokers, or absent, e.g., non-smokers, to explain an ob-
39 See supra note 12, for an explanation of the standard binomial test. Further examples
are given in 1 GASTWiRTH, supra note 19, at 167-77.
40 This approach was accepted in Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 653 (5th
Cir. 1983), in which the evidence was that men would have needed to form 98% of the
labor pool in order for the zero number of female hires not to be statistically significant.
41 A result is more statistically significant than another if the probability of it occurring
due to chance or a process of random selection is smaller.
42 SeeJoseph L. Gastwirth, Employment Discrimination: A Statistician's Look at Analysis of
Disparate Impact Claims, in II LAw & INEQ. 151, 155 (1992).
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served ratio of two proportions, e.g., the lung cancer rates of smokers
and non-smokers. Because it examines whether a particular "missing
factor" could account for the observed disparity or ratio of two pro-
portions, it focuses on the known influence of the specific factor and
the data from the actual case.
First, the omitted factor or factors must be at least as strongly
related to the response, that is, multiply one's chance of producing
response (such as requesting a life sentence) as the ratio of black to
white life sentencing requests in the data. Secondly, the prevalence
(proportion of individuals meeting the factor) of the factor among
black eligibles needs to be much larger than the prevalence amongst
whites. For example, if we have 1000 black defendants, 250 of whom
use firearms, the prevalence of firearm use in that population would
be .25.
To state the result we need to define the relative risk as the ratio
of two proportions. In the state data, the relative risk, R, of a black
facing a life sentence is (202/1219)/(1/168) = .1657/.0059 = 27.8
times that of a white eligible. The formal statement of Cornfield's
lemma48 is:
In order for an omitted factor (X) to explain an observed relative risk
(R),
a) the relative risk (Rx), associated with factor X must exceed R, and





b2) f2 >-Rfi + (R-1)/(RA-I).
In our application of the lemma, we allow for sampling variability
by using the lower end of a 95% confidence interval4 for 1, instead of
the 27.8 calculated from the raw data. This value is 5.01, which im-
plies that in order for a factor to explain the data it must multiply a
drug criminal's chance of having the prosecution ask for a life sen-
tence by five-fold and its prevalence amongst black repeat drug of-
fenders must be at least five times its prevalence amongst whites.
Suppose one or several of the factors Judge Fletcher listed would
justify the prosecution requesting a life sentence. This implies that
43 Id. at 156.
44 If one considered that the offenders given a life sentence were a random sample
from those eligible, there would be a range of observed relative risks. A 95% confidence
interval is a commonly used range of plausible values for the true relative risk, R Techni-
cally, if one took many samples 95% of the time, the true Rwill lie in the interval obtained
from the sample.
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they would increase an offender's probability of being given a life sen-
tence by a factor, R, For illustrative purposes we take R,-10, although
our experience suggests that this is quite large. If only one-half of one
percent of the white defendants had this factor, then equation b2)
implies that 47.1% of the black defendants would need to possess this
factor. 45 As we are comparing blacks and whites convicted for drug
crimes, it does not seem realistic to believe that the prevalences of any
of the factors mentioned by Judge Fletcher differ so widely in the two
groups. Moreover, no evidence was cited indicating that any of the
variables mentioned, either individually or collectively, increase the
probability a prosecutor could justifiably ask for a life sentence by a
factor of 5, much less the value 10 used in the above calculation.
While we believe that the state should be asked to demonstrate
that the factors listed by Judge Fletcher satisfy the criterion for reduc-
ing the disparity to a non-significant magnitude,46 we examine
whether the named factors satisfy the conditions of the Cornfield
lemma. First, it seems quite implausible that some of the factors could
meet the prevalence condition, that is, be five times more prevalent
among black eligibles than whites. For instance, could the type of
legal counsel or the rates of entering guilty pleas of eligible black and
white defendants differ by a factor of five?
We next review some studies which looked at jury decisions or
racial differences in sentencing to see whether some of the explana-
tory factors accepted by the majority had a sufficiently strong effect
and were so differently distributed in the white and black groups that
Cornfield's condition could reasonably be met. Spohn, Gruhl, and
Welch 47 studied the sentences imposed on 2366 individuals convicted
of crimes in a large city. There were 1939 black defendants and 427
whites in their sample.48 They observed that most of the disparity in
sentences received by black and white criminal defendants was ex-
plained by the charge brought and the existence of a prior record.
However, even after controlling for legal and extra-legal factors, black
males had a higher probability of receiving a prison sentence than
similar whites.49 Because the statistical technique, multiple linear re-
gression, used by those authors is more appropriate for continuous
variables such as length of sentence than binary or yes-no variables we
45 This follows by substituting the values R=-5.0, f'=.005, and K=10 in the right side of
equation (b2), yielding (5.01)(.005)+(4.01)/9 = .471.
46 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47 Cassia Spohn et al., The Effect of Race on Sentencing. A R-Examination of an Unsettled
Question, 16 L. & Soc'y REv. 71 (1981).
48 Id. at 74.
49 Id. at 85.
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will not discuss the details of their study.
50
The classic study by Kalven and Zeisel51 ofjury verdicts also noted
that the type of attorney had a minor effect on the verdict. However,
a recent reanalysis by Gastwirth and Sinclair5 2 showed that the odds of
ajury being more lenient than ajudge in serious crimes were doubled
if the judge thought the defendant's lawyer was superior to the prose-
cution's. 53 While the drug crimes involved in Stephens would be seri-
ous, the potential effect of a better lawyer is not even close to the
factor of 5 required by the Cornfield lemma.M Moreover, no evi-
dence of a difference in type or quality of attorney by black and white
defendants was cited in the opinion.
Thus, the legal factors cited by Judge Fletcher in the Stephens
opinion do not appear sufficiently strongly related to the probability
of imprisonment to explain the difference in life sentences requested
by Georgia state prosecutors. Of greater importance is that the major
explanatory variables found in the Spohn et al. studyn-type of charge
and the existence of a prior record-are quite similar for repeat drug
offenders. The charge is always a drug offense and all individuals eli-
gible have a prior record of such an offense. 55 While it is conceivable
that blacks might have more prior offenses, be involved in different
types of drug-related criminal activity than whites, or have a much
higher frequency of violence associated with their crimes, courts
50 To illustrate, the inappropriateness of the correlation measures used in linear rgres-
sion for assessing the strength of relationship between binary variables, we examine their
reporting an ordinary Pearson correlation, r, of race and imprisonment of .144. The cor-
relation is commonly used to describe the relationship between continuous variables such
as LSAT score and law school GPA, where correlations of .3 to .5 are usual. Thus, one
might believe that their result indicates a small relationship between race and imprison-
ment. The following table shows that an r=-.144 can reflect quite a meaningful difference
in proportions:
Prison Sentence Not Total % Incarcerated
Black 2249 5751 8000 28.11%
White 251 1749 2000 12.55%
While the Pearson correlation between race and receiving a prison sentence is .144, blacks
are more than twice as likely to receive such a sentence than whites.
51 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEisE., THE AMmUCANJuRY 351-72 (1966).
52 Joseph L. Gastwirth and Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-Examination of the Kalven-Zeisel
Study of Judge-Jury Agreements Using Recent Contingency Table Analysis Techniques
(January, 1997) (unpublished Technical Report, on file with the Department of Statistics,
The George Washington University).
53 Id. at 9.
54 Technically, the odds ratio is a different measure than the relative risk. For the data
in the Stephens case, however, the odds ratio exceeds the relative risk. Hence the value 2
may overestimate the effect of a better lawyer in the Cornfield lemma.
55 Spohn et al., supra note 47, at 83.
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should require the presentation of such evidence. This is especially
true in Stephens, where a study of drug offenders in Georgia during the
period from January 1977 through May 1985 was available. 56
Myers found that the probability of being given a prison sentence
depended on the defendant's involvement in the drug trade, and was
.2 for users, .4 for sales offenses, and .6 for trafficking.57 From Table I
in Myers we calculated that 63.57% of black offenders were users,
35.64% were selling drugs and only 0.79% were traffickers. Corre-
spondingly, 72.83% of whites were users, 26.25% were selling drugs,
and 0.92% were traffickers. Thus, the prevalences are similar, and the
largest ratio, 1.36, occurs for the seller category (35.64/26.25). If
these prevalences are even roughly applicable to more current Geor-
gia data, then the second part of Cornfield's criterion, which requires
a five-fold difference in the proportions of black and whites in the
categories of drug offenders deserving the most serious punishment,
cannot be satisfied. Since the statute allowing life imprisonment fo-
cuses on the distribution of drugs, the ratio of the probabilities of
incarceration for individuals who were traffickers or sellers to that of
users should indicate the increased likelihood of a severe penalty.
With Myers' data, these ratios were 3.0 (traffickers to users) and 2.0
(sellers to users), again substantially less than the factor of 5 required
by Cornfield's lemma. This implies that, by itself, the degree of in-
volvement in the drug trade cannot fully explain the racial disparity in
the state-wide data.
Furthermore, a regression analysis relating the probability of re-
ceiving a prison sentence to race and related factors such as the na-
ture of the offense and the seriousness of the crime estimated that
blacks had a 13% higher probability of receiving a prison sentence
than similarly situated whites.58 That analysis did not include data on
prior arrests or incarcerations, but the number of prior arrests was
negatively related to the degree of involvement in the drug trade. In-
deed, the average number of prior arrests was 3.3 for users, 2.8 for
salespersons, and 2.2 for traffickers. Myers observed that for both
blacks and whites the probability of imprisonment increased with the
degree of involvement in the drug trade. The racial disparity also in-
creased with the level of involvement. Indeed, black users were 12.5%
more likely to receive a prison term than whites.59 The corresponding
56 Martha A. Myers, Symbolic Policy and the Sentencing of Drug Offenders, 23 L. & Soc'y REv.
295 (1989).
57 Id. at 302 tbl.1.
58 Id. at 305 tbl.3.
59 Id. at 310 tbl.5.
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disparities for sales and trafficking offenders were 18.6% and 24.6%.60
This implies that the seriousness of the drug-related offense is unlikely
to justify the racial disparity in Stephens, as the racial disparity in im-
prisonment rates increased with the seriousness of drug activity. Had
the racial disparities in incarceration rates decreased with the level of
involvement, then this factor might help explain the data in Stephens.
If the prevalences of the various offenses or the racial disparities in
imprisonment rates changed in the direction of greater fairness in the
time between Myers' study and the trial, one could have expected the
state to submit this information in the Stephens case.
An earlier study by Unnever,61 of 313 drug offenders in Miami
during 1971, illustrates the wisdom of Judge Posner's remark in Allen
v. Seidman that it is possible for a full statistical analysis incorporating
alleged confounding factors suggested by the party opposing a statisti-
cal presentation to actually strengthen the original conclusion.62 In a
logistic regression 63 of the odds of receiving a prison sentence, as
more variables, such as the number of charges, ball status, and type of
attorney were added,,the odds of a black defendant receiving a prison
sentence relative to a similar white actually increased slightly from
about 2.1 to 2.5.64 While receiving a prison sentence from ajudge is
different than having a prosecutor request a life sentence, the fact
that adjusting for these factors in an analysis of drug offenders in
Miami did not reduce the racial disparity raises serious doubts that
they could explain the substantial disparity in life sentence requests in
the Georgia data.
It should be emphasized that we are not claiming that racial dis-
parities as large as the one in the statewide data on prosecutorial re-
quests for life sentences in Georgia could never be explained by a
legitimate race-neutral factor or set of such factors. Cornfield's crite-
ria, however, indicate that these factors would need to be extremely
highly related to a defendant deserving a life sentence, and the frac-
tion of black repeat drug offenders possessing these factors would
need to be much larger than the corresponding fraction of white re-
peat drug offenders. The relevant literature we examined indicates
that these conditions are not likely to be satisfied by the factors listed
by Justice Fletcher, as they could not come close to "explaining" simi-
60 Id.
61 SeeJames D. Unnever, Direct and Organizational Discrimination in the Sentencing of Drug
Offenders, 30 Soc. PROBLEMS 212 (1982).
62 Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1989).
63 Logistic regression is a variant of regression, supra note 19, in which the response is a
yes-no or 0-1 variable. It is appropriate for the examination of hiring and promotion data.
See 1 GASTiRTH, supra note 19, at 442-55.
64 Unnever, supra note 61, at 219 tbl.2.
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lar racial disparities in incarceration rates of drug offenders.
IV. US v. ARMSTRONG: How MUCH EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
IS NEEDED TO OBTAIN DISCOVERY?
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In U.S. v. Armstrong,65 the defendants were indicted for conspir-
ing to distribute cocaine base, and some were charged with selling
crack and using a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. They
alleged that the government discriminated against them as blacks in
deciding to prosecute them for violating federal rather than state
law.6 6 The sentence for such charges is noticeably greater under fed-
eral law.67 The defendants moved for discovery on their claim but the
government chose not to comply with the court order, arguing that
there was no evidence that the government had acted unfairly.6a
To support their claim of selective prosecution the defendants
cited a study of the twenty-four cases prosecuted under the relevant
laws. 69 All twenty-four defendants were black. On the basis of the
data the district court ordered the government to:
1) provide a list of all cases it prosecuted for cocaine base and firearms
offenses;
2) identify the race of the defendants;
3) identify which law enforcement agency investigated the case; and
4) explain the criteria the U.S. Attorneys used to decide to bring co-
caine base cases to federal court.
70
While the government did not supply all the information, it did
contend that seven non-black defendants had been prosecuted,
although all were members of minority groups, and that many blacks
had been prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court. The govern-
ment also referred to four specific factors it considered in bringing
the cases to federal court:
1) strength of the evidence;
2) the deterrent value of bringing a charge;
3) the federal interest in bringing the charge; and
4) the criminal history of the suspect.
More importantly, the government explained, the defendants had all
65 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), rev'g48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
66 Armstrong, 116 S. C. at 1483.
67 Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1511. The sentence is a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of
life under Federal law, and a minimum of three years to a maximum of five years for a
comparable offense under California law. Id.
68 Armstrong 116 S. C. at 1484.
69 Id. at 1483 & n.1. See 21 U.S.C. § 841, 846.
70 Armstrong, 116 S. C. at 1484.
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been involved extensively in drug dealing.71
In response, the defendants provided information that blacks and
whites were equally represented among cocaine base addicts at a par-
ticular treatment center, and that many whites were prosecuted in
state court.7 2 The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the cases
ordered by the district judge in response to the government's refusal
to obey the discovery order.78 The appellate majority agreed with the
district judge's decision that the data was sufficient in number and
time frame to require the government to provide some explanation of
its procedures.7 4 The dissent argued that the data did not compare
the twenty-four blacks prosecuted with a group of similarly situated
individuals of other races.7 5 It cited data showing that 87.9% of all
those convicted for cocaine-based offenses nationwide are African-
American. 76
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the data sub-
mitted to the Court were sufficient to support discovery in selective
prosecution cases. 77 The Court also considered whether Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16 was applicable. As this second issue is
purely a legal one, the statistical evidence had no role in that part of
the decision.
After noting that the showing necessary to obtain discovery
should be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial
claims,78 the Supreme Court held that in order to meet the legal re-
quirements entitling discovery, the defendant must produce evidence
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been pros-
ecuted but were not.79
The Armstrong majority pointed out that the Court of Appeals
reached its earlier decision by assuming that people of all races com-
mit all types of crimes, and that no type of crime is the exclusive prov-
ince of any particular group. The opinion cites data showing that
91% of individuals convicted of pornography or prostitution were
white, while over 90% of those convicted of crack cocaine trafficking
were black.80
The Court did not accept the defendants' data on the percentage
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.; see also Armstrong, 48 F.Sd 1508, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995).
74 Armstrong 48 F.Sd at 1516.
75 Id. at 1521-22, 1524 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1524 n.4 (Rymer, J. dissenting).
77 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
78 Id. at 1486.




of black persons in drug treatment, or the attorney's affadivit that
many non-blacks were prosecuted in state court for crack offenses,
holding that such evidence did not meet the required showing of dif-
ferent treatment of similarly situated persons.81 The Court observed
that the defendant had not identified non-black individuals who could
have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were
charged but were not prosecuted.8 2
B. THE MINORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens' dissent criticized the majority opinion for dis-
counting the affadavit of an experienced criminal defense lawyer.8 3
Justice Stevens noted that the presumption that some whites are pros-
ecuted in state court is not "contradicted" by the statistics on the per-
centage of blacks convicted. Indeed, they are consistent with selective
prosecution of blacks. The most relevant comparison therefore would
use the racial composition of individuals who commit the crime. 84
In a footnote85 Justice Stevens refers to the Government's own
data as showing that of 3500 defendants charged with Federal narcot-
ics violations during the previous three years, all but eleven were
black. Furthermore, those eleven were all from other minority
groups. No white defendant was among the 3500.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
In this section we first examine the implication of the defendants'
data and then consider the larger data base described in the dissent.
Recall that the defendant suggested that the percentage (50%) of
black individuals receiving drug treatment was a reasonable estimate
of those involved in drug dealing, while the dissenting judge at the
appellate level used the 87.9% figure derived from convictions in the
nation.
In Table 1 we provide the results of the statistical test used by the
court in Castenada v. PartidaP6 for various black fractions (p) ranging
from .5 to .879. If the defendants' value of p = .5 is correct, then the
probability that all twenty-four individuals prosecuted would be black
would be less than one in one million, corresponding to a difference
of 4.9 standard deviations from expected. This disparity is far in ex-
cess of the two to three standard deviation criteria set forth in Cas-
81 Id. at 1489.
82 Id. at 1489.
83 Id. at 1494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1495 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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tenada.87 On the other hand, if the nationwide data is appropriate, p =
.879, and the disparity is 1.8 standard deviation units, which is less
than the two standard deviation criteria adopted by the Court. This
criterion corresponds to the .05 (or five percent) level of significance
that is typically used in scientific journals.
TABLE 1. THE PROBABILITY OF OBSERVING TWENTY-FOUR BLACKS IN A
SAMPLE OF TWENTY-FOUR INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN FROM A POPULATION
WHERE BLACKS FORM THE FRACTION P OF THE POPULATION.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction (p) Exp. Number STD. DEV Z-score one-sided prob.
.50 12 2.4495 4.899 6 x 108
.60 14.4 2.40 4.0 4.74 x 106
.70 16.8 2.245 3.207 1.92 x 10'
.75 18 2.1213 2.828 .0010
.80 19.2 1.9596 2.449 .0047
.85 20.4 1.7493 2.058 .0202
.879 21.096 1.5977 1.818 .0453
Note: The Z-score is the statistic used in Castenada v. Partida which is the normal approximation
to the exact binomial test. It is the ratio of the difference between the actual data (24) and the
expected number (col. (2)) divided by the std. deviation (col. (3)).
It seems clear, however, that the .879 figure may well be too high
as it refers to persons convicted, who first must be prosecuted. If the
government does selectively prosecute blacks, then their proportion
amongst persons convicted is likely to reflect the alleged discrimina-
tion.88 Moreover, the applicability of national data to a single district
is questionable, especially if the racial make-up of the district differs
from that of the nation. When a firm's hires are compared to a proxy
labor force in equal employment cases courts require data from the
local labor market, often adjusting for skills and commuting pat-
terns.89 On the other hand, the defendants' assumption that the ad-
87 Id. at 512 n.17.
88 There is data suggesting this may be the case. See Memorandum from Richard Berk
and Alec Campbell to Paul Rochnes, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack ChargingPractices in
Los Angels, 6 FED. SENr. REP. 36 (1993) (over a two-year period, blacks formed 58% of
arrests, but 83% of those charged at the Federal level).
89 See DAVID C. BALDus &JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 61-67
(Supp. 1987); Sheldon E. Haber &Joseph L. Gastwirth, Specifying the Labor Marketfor Indi-
vidual Firms, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (August 1978), for discussions of weighted labor
markets. These authors note that it is important to use weights obtained from residence
data from actual applicants rather than from employees. Indeed, in Markey v. Tenneco Oil
Co., 635 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1981), weighting each sub-area by residence of applicants
yielded an availability of 42% while weighting by residence of employees at their time of
hire yielded a figure of 32.61%. Id. at 500 n.3. Thus, the area or region used to determine
the black fraction of potential employees or, as in Armstrong, their fraction of those accused
for cocaine related crimes is quite important. Just as unrefined national data should not
be used in an equal employment case, it should not be accepted as providing a reliable
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dict population is a proxy pool for any traffickers is also questionable
as addicts often are users rather than dealers.
From Table 1 we can obtain the minimum value of the fraction of
black individuals eligible for prosecution that would yield a figure of
twenty-four blacks out of twenty-four prosecutions as a plausible result
of sampling from this eligible population. If we select a level of signifi-
cance of .001, corresponding to 2.88 standard deviations, we see that
p = .75. Thus, unless the fraction of blacks involved in cocaine base
drug violations in the district is at least .75, the data would be statisti-
cally significant at nearly the three standard deviation level. If one
believed that statistical significance at the two standard deviation level
would be sufficient for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case,
then the fraction of black persons accused of cocaine base related
drug crimes would only need to exceed p = .854. The defendants'
data would satisfy the two standard deviation criteria if the govern-
ment's national figure (p = .879) that was accepted by the dissenting
appellate judge overestimates p by just .03.
An amicus brief filed in the Armstrong case 9° reported the follow-
ing racial data on defendants charged in federal crack prosecutions as
a result of sting operations in the Central District of California during
1992-94: black (109), Hispanic (28), Asian (8), and white (1).91 Thus,
blacks formed 74.7 percent of these defendants. 92 As this data per-
tains to the same District, it is more relevant than the national data.
Had this fraction (p = .747) been used in Table 1, a result very close to
the one for p = .75 would have been found-i.e., the data would al-
most reach significance at the three standard deviations level.
The Armstrong opinion used the relative risk measure in describ-
ing the discriminatory effect of a section of the Alabama Constitution
examined by the Court in Hunter v. Underwood.93 The Court noted
that in that case, by modest estimates blacks were at least 1.7 times as
likely to be disenfranchised under the constitutional provision in
question. 94 We now calculate a statistically conservative estimate of
the risk an eligible black drug defendant had of being prosecuted in
federal court, relative to a white defendant in the Central District of
California. If we consider the twenty-four offenders prosecuted for
crack offenses in 1991 as a sample of all prosecutions over a period of
estimate of the black fraction of accused criminals eligible for federal prosecution in the
Los Angeles area.
90 Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae,
U.S. v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (No. 95-157).
91 Id. at 16.
92 Id.
93 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
94 U.S. v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (quoting Hunter 471 U.S. at 227).
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years, there is (as we noted earlier) a high degree of confidence that
the fraction of black defendants prosecuted is at least .8575. 95 As
blacks formed only 74.7% of those eligible for federal prosecution,
the risk of a black drug offender relative to a white drug offender of
being prosecuted in federal court is shown by the equation 96
(.8575/.1425) / (.747/.253) = 6.0175/2.9526 = 2.038.
As 2.04 exceeds 1.7, the value the Court accepted as demonstrating
discriminatory effect in Hunter, this value should support a finding of
discriminatory effect here.
Since the criteria for obtaining discovery should be less than that
required to establish a prima facie case, and as over 85% of individuals
eligible for prosecution under Federal law would need to be black in
order for the data not to be statistically significant, it seems to us that
some further investigation of the racial composition of eligibles is
appropriate.
We now examine the implication of the second data set cited by
Justice Stevens. A similar calculation shows that in order for no whites
to be among the 3500 persons prosecuted for Federal narcotics viola-
tions not to be statistically significant, whites would need to form less
than two-tenths of one percent of those eligible for prosecution for drug
offenses. Given the widespread illegal use of narcotics in the nation
and in California, we doubt that the white percentage of eligibles
could be so low. Indeed, none of the large racial imbalances amongst
persons convicted of various types of crimes cited in the majority opin-
ion 97 are this lopsided.
D. RELATED ISSUES
While our re-analysis of the data in the Armstrong case supports
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion that discovery is justified, it is quite
possible that a careful study would show that the Government also was
justified in prosecuting the defendants in Federal court. According to
an affidavit cited in the opinion98 the defendants participated in mul-
tiple sales of cocaine base that exceeded twice the threshold necessary
for a mandatory ten year sentence and the evidence against them was
95 See supra tbl.1 and accompanying text.
96 The formula is equivalent to equation (5B.2) in 1 GAsrwiRs-, supra note 19, at 241,
with p = .747, and alt = .8575. A simple illustrative calculation, using the same percentages
of eligibles (.747) and selected for prosecution (.8575) may be helpful. Suppose there are
100,000 eligible drug offenders (74,700 black, 25,300 white). Ten thousand (8575 black,
1425 white) are prosecuted in Federal court. The relative risk of a black to a non-black
offender would be (85700/74700) / (1425/25300) = 2.038. An equivalent formula is dis-
cussed in BADUS & CoLE, supra note 89, at 85 n.18.
97 Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
98 Id. at 1484.
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quite strong. Only an examination of the files under the control of
the government, however, could demonstrate that all drug offenders
so highly involved in the drug trade were prosecuted under the fed-
eral statute, and that race did not influence the prosecution decisions
against such serious offenders.
The need for discovery in this case is similar to that in employ-
ment discrimination cases where the relevant information is entirely
in the files of the employer. As Judge Posner's opinion in Riordan v.
Kempiners99 observed, discrimination is difficult to prove, as the best
workers will be retained. Thus, an employer's discriminatory practices
would more likely manifest themselves in the treatment of average or
merely satisfactory employees. 100 By analogy, one would expect that
prosecutors who might be biased against a minority group would be
harder on minority offenders whose level of criminal activity slightly
exceeded a threshold for a more serious penalty than on comparable
whites.
The Armstrong opinion suggests that the Court was concerned
with placing a large administrative burden upon the Government,
which would need to assemble information from many files to per-
form this analysis. 10 ' From a statistical view, a random sample of
about three hundred files would probably suffice to estimate the white
proportion 02 of drug offenders eligible for prosecution under federal
law. If whites formed less than twenty-five percent of the sample, then
from Table 1 it follows that the defendants' data would not show a
statistically significant bias against blacks at the .001 level, correspond-
ing to 2.8 standard deviations. Sample surveys are routinely used in
Lanham Act cases,' 03 and using a sample of individual cases in large
class action tort cases to determine a schedule for awarding damages
has been used by one court, and recommended in the legal litera-
ture.10 4 Selecting a random sample of records for the purpose of dis-
covery when unfairness issues are raised in criminal cases may prove
99 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1987).
100 Id. at 1360.
101 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
102 To determine the sample size, n, needed to estimate a fraction, p, to within .05 with
95% confidence, one uses the formula
n = (1.96) 2p(1-p)/(.05) .
See LYMAN Orr r A.., STATISrIcS: A TOOL FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 202 (3rd ed.
1983). In our problem, the white fraction, p, of eligible drug offenders is about p = .25.
Using this value in the formula yields n = 289, or about 300.
103 See, e.g., supra note 1.
104 SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars: TheDilemma oftheMass Tort Class Action, 95 COLuM.
L. REv. 1343 (1995); Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 815, 851
(1992); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 659-65 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
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useful and efficient. It would give defendants a reasonable opportu-
nity to discover similarly situated defendants of other races who were




The re-examination of the data in the Stephens and Armstrong
cases utilizing Cornfield's result and related statistical tools suggests
that black drug offenders have a basis for questioning the fairness of
both state and federal prosecutions. The noticeable racial disparity in
the data from the Stephens case does not appear to be fully explicable
on grounds other than race.
In the Armstrong case, the data cited by Justice Stevens appears to
be much stronger evidence of a racial disparity in the treatment of
drug offenders than the small study introduced by the defendants.
Although the sample size, twenty-four in the defendants' study, is rela-
tively small, the fact that all twenty-four individuals prosecuted were
black implies that the data was as extreme as possible. As an exper-
ienced attorney submitted evidence that some white offenders were
eligible for prosecution, the data would appear to justify some discov-
ery. We suggest that a reasonably-sized random sample might well suf-
fice for this purpose.
An advantage of sampling is that it reduces the burden on state
and federal governments while enabling defendants who have pro-
duced some credible evidence of selective prosecution, perhaps based
on a small study, to pursue their claim. This should achieve the goal
of more liberal criminal discovery advocated by some commenta-
tors,106 while requiring the defendants to produce some support for
their claim and preventing defendants from flooding the prosecutors
with requests for large numbers of files.
105 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
106 See, e.g., Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling
the Promise of EqualJustic 84 GEo. LJ. 2043 (1996).
